Sir John Sawers, the British ambassdor to the UN, was very explicit about it. He explained that, according to Great Britain, it was time to take appropriate action to settle the status of Kosovo. He added they would have preferred doing it via the Security Council, but still they trusted that the 1244 Resolution of the Security Council offered a legal basis enough for going on towards a final consensus that would decide on the authorities to do it. It is just that there emerges a very serious problem. I would like to remind you about the context of the war bursting out against Miloshevik's Yugoslavia and the time when the NATO ambassadors got together at once to consent to the start of operations. They were relying on a generic decision of the Security Council, at that time accusing this international institution of lacking a decision and thinking that the situation in Kosovo allowed for skipping the obligation to take action only with view to a special UN mandate. But at that time they told us that it was about an exceptional situation that would never get repeated, just to consolidate the international public opinion's trust in the feasibility of the UN system to settle crises. And the same critical point has been reached again. It is just that the proportion of the crisis is completely different, just because everyone is convinced that the obstinate words of US and Brussels officials, both from NATO and the UN, are deeply false: Kosovo will not be a precedent! This is deeply untrue, since the Kosovo solution itself will mean a juridical precedent at international level. Right now the same goes for the type of action to follow in order to settle the crisis, a non-UN action. In which way will the EU get involved and on grounds of which mandate? Just like the NATO in 1999, the EU may define its own status by means of a decision belonging to state presidents and governments. This too will mean a precedent, since there will be a decision on an action outside its scope of direct competence. Until now they said the action was justified just by the emergence of a major crisis to threaten the EU interests directly. Will such a decision be reached despite the very clearly expressed opposition of Slovakia, Spain, Greece, Cyprus and Romania? If so, what are the latter states going to do? Will they make a civil mission and boycot the participation to the fast response force that will anyway have to be activated? If the EU imposes a solution such as protection in Kosovo, it will somehow be a clue that it can do the same if Transdniestria asks for independence, just like Ossetia, Abhasia, Nagorno-Karabah, possibly Voivodina and Sirbska Republic. Vitali Surkin, the Russian ambassador to the UN, opined that, if things exceeded the legal frame and got to unilateral moves, it would mean a shock wave on the international system and legislation. Unilateral moves? This phrase dates back to the time before the making of the UN, which was meant to prevent this very thing, theoretically. A failure that can cost a lot.

Cristian UNTEANU