EDITORIAL

After 88 years as part of monarchist and then communist Yugoslavia, Montenegro is becoming an independent state again. A velvet divorce with Serbia appears to have been accomplished. At first sight the EU played a benign role in laying down the terms of the referendum, with a Yes vote of 55% being required before it would accept secession. But in reality the European Commission behaved like the imperial overlords of pre-1914 Europe whose jealousies and obsessions contributed to the instability of the Balkans. Javier Solana, the EU's Commissioner for Security, and one of the heroes of the 1999 confrontation with the Serbian tyrant, Slobodan Milosevic when he tried to deport the Albanians of Kosovo, has shown his petty side over Montenegro. This Spanish Socialist has metaphorisised into a latter-day Hapsburg prince, trampling on local desires in order to fulfil his own strategic plans for the region.

As long as Milosevic ruled Serbia and exported conflict to neighbours whose territory he coveted, the West was happy to see Montenegro draw apart from Serbia. Beginning his political career as an ally of Milosevic, Milo Djukanovic was one of the few underlings who successfully defied the Serbian strongman, for whom violence was second nature. Today still only 45, Djukanovic broke with Milosevic in the second half of the 1990s.Montenegro's acquisition of a separate currency showed that two states which had epitomised the 'brotherhood and unity' which was the symbol of Yugoslavia when it was a viable federation under Tito, were going their separate ways. Montenegro provided landlocked Serbia with a sea coast while jobs in the swollen Belgrade bureaucracy had drawn a large percentage of Montenegrins to live in Serbia. But as Serbia became an international pariah in the 1990s, most Montenegrins preferred to align with the West. Rival security forces made the mountainous republic a dangerous place, especially when its leaders supported NATO in its 1999 confrontation with Serbia.

Romania did the same at far less risk and was rewarded with the opening of EU accession talks . If Montengro assumed its de facto separation from Serbia would be confirmed by a grateful EU, it got a big surprise. After 2000, with Milosevic out of power, Brussels made it a priority to conciliate Serbia, now led by a courageous reformer, Zorin Djindjic. Montenegro was told it would have to bury its independence dreams for the sake of regional stability. When Djukanovic protested, he became persona non grata in Washington and Brussels and the EU appeared to take very seriously claims that he had been involved in smuggling tobacco in the 1990s. Solana claimed that further territorial fragmentation might encourage breakaway moves among the Serbs and Croats in Bosnia. Secession might only give the initiative to extremists in Serbia. Besides, this pocket-sized land of only 800,000 people might lack the capacity to integrate into EU institutions.

These were unconvincing grounds for the EU's volte-face. The negotiations for a State Union between Serbia and Montenegro proved extremely time-consuming and prevented Djindjic moving against the criminal networks, one of which succeeded in murdering him in 2003. Djukanovic showed more determination to tackle organized crime and corruption than his counterpart in Serbia, Prime Minister Kostunica, an unapologetic nationalist. Unable to shake off its pariah image, Serbia failed to regain the affections of most Montengrins who wanted to follow their own course. They were keen to market the tourist potential of one of the last unspoilt corners of the northern Mediterranean on which is located the beautiful bay of Kotor, the only fjord in southern Europe. Pro-Serb sentiment exists especially where people from Serbia, often with military backgrounds, have chosen to retire. But the referendum of 21 May was orderly and the narrow vote in favour was recognised by Belgrade.

Romania should not be concerned about a 6th new state emerging from Yugoslavia, with Kosovo probably soon to follow. There are no significant forces which would like to make this a precedent for the dismemberment of the country. What ought to be of concern is the way that significant players in the EU tried to block independence in a country where it was the majority preference. Wider geopolitical concerns were felt to take precedence. Such arguments could be heard again and were on display some years ago when West European diplomats tried to promote a federation between Moldova and the breakaway Transnistria on terms that clearly suited the men who ruled in Tiraspol. We might see the thirst for oil and gas allowing geopolitical factors to dominate EU strategy in the Black Sea region where young and insecure states still struggle to free themselves from Russia's embrace, with only spasmodic interest from the West.

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