Editorial

Din link-ul furnizat de mata am adunat mai jos tot ce-am gasit despre presupusele wonder weapons irakiene. Am adugat chiar si nota de final, care e foarte sugestiva. Mi se par a fi doar banuieli, si acelea vagi. Cat despre contacte cu Al Quaida nimic, nimic, nimic. Si e vb de sursa matale considerata mai mult decat credibila.
When it came to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Saddam attempted to convince one audience that they were gone while simultaneously convincing another that Iraq still had them. Coming clean about WMD and using full compliance with inspections to escape from sanctions would have been his best course of action for the long run. Saddam, however, found it impossible to abandon the illusion of having WMD, especially since it played so well in the Arab world.
Ali Hassan al-Majid, known as "Chemical Ali" for his use of chemical weapons on Kurdish civilians in 1987, was convinced Iraq no longer possessed WMD but claims that many within Iraq's ruling circle never stopped believing that the weapons still existed. Even at the highest echelons of the regime, when it came to WMD there was always some element of doubt about the truth. According to Chemical Ali, Saddam was asked about the weapons during a meeting with members of the Revolutionary Command Council. He replied that Iraq did not have WMD but flatly rejected a suggestion that the regime remove all doubts to the contrary, going on to explain that such a declaration might encourage the Israelis to attack. [See Footnote #1 below]
By late 2002, Saddam finally tilted toward trying to persuade the international community that Iraq was cooperating with the inspectors of UNSCOM (the UN Special Commission) and that it no longer had WMD programs. As 2002 drew to a close, his regime worked hard to counter anything that might be seen as supporting the coalition's assertion that WMD still remained in Iraq. Saddam was insistent that Iraq would give full access to UN inspectors "in order not to give President Bush any excuses to start a war." But after years of purposeful obfuscation, it was difficult to convince anyone that Iraq was not once again being economical with the truth.
Ironically, it now appears that some of the actions resulting from Saddam's new policy of cooperation actually helped solidify the coalition's case for war. Over the years, Western intelligence services had obtained many internal Iraqi communications, among them a 1996 memorandum from the director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service directing all subordinates to "insure that there is no equipment, materials, research, studies, or books related to manufacturing of the prohibited weapons (chemical, biological, nuclear, and missiles) in your site." And when UN inspectors went to these research and storage locations, they inevitably discovered lingering evidence of WMD-related programs.
In 2002, therefore, when the United States intercepted a message between two Iraqi Republican Guard Corps commanders discussing the removal of the words "nerve agents" from "the wireless instructions," or learned of instructions to "search the area surrounding the headquarters camp and [the unit] for any chemical agents, make sure the area is free of chemical containers, and write a report on it," U.S. analysts viewed this information through the prism of a decade of prior deceit. They had no way of knowing that this time the information reflected the regime's attempt to ensure it was in compliance with UN resolutions.
What was meant to prevent suspicion thus ended up heightening it. The tidbit about removing the term "nerve agents" from radio instructions was prominently cited as an example of Iraqi bad faith by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in his February 5, 2003, statement to the UN.
Another factor reduced Iraq's military effectiveness: sanctions. For more than a dozen years, UN sanctions had frayed the fiber of the Iraqi military by making it difficult for Baghdad to purchase new equipment, procure spare parts, or fund adequate training. Attempts to overcome the effects of the sanctions led Saddam to create the Military Industrial Commission as a means to sustain the military. The commission and a series of subordinate organizations steadily promised new capabilities to offset the effects of poor training, poor morale, and neglected equipment. Saddam apparently waited for the delivery of wonder weapons that would reverse the erosion of his military strength.
...
[Footnote #1] For many months after the fall of Baghdad, a number of senior Iraqi officials in coalition custody continued to believe it possible that Iraq still possessed a WMD capability hidden away somewhere (although they adamantly insisted that they had no direct knowledge of WMD programs). Coalition interviewers discovered that this belief was based on the fact that Iraq had possessed and used WMD in the past and might need them again; on the plausibility of secret, compartmentalized WMD programs existing given how the Iraqi regime worked; and on the fact that so many Western governments believed such programs existed.

Hantzi, USA au avut chiar un spion in guvernul lui Sadam care le-a confirmat ca Sadam nu mai are WDM.

http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20060321/ts_nm/iraq_usa_source_dc;_ylt=At11qT1s4J_HAdi2HQd0kxtg.3QA;_ylu=X3oDMTA4b3FrcXQ0BHNlYwMxNjkz

La 2006-03-21 17:45:13, Katty a scris:

> Hantzi, USA au avut chiar un spion in guvernul lui Sadam care le-a
> confirmat ca Sadam nu mai are WDM.


Pentru cei care nu au timp sa se duca pe linkul lui Katty:

According to the intelligence sources, Sabri indicated that Saddam had no significant weapons program and that while the deposed Iraqi leader desperately wanted a nuclear bomb it would have taken more time for him to build one than the CIA's several-months-to-a-year estimate, NBC reported.

Both the CIA and Sabri said Saddam had stockpiled chemical weapons, but both were wrong, NBC said.


Hantzi, o tii ca gaia-matu' cu dovezile tale. Articolul lui Katty nu demonstreaza altceva decit cit de dificila este activitatea asta numita "intelligence" (o meserie de senior, dupa cum zicea cineva), cit de greu este sa coroborezi sursele, cui sa dai crezare, cui nu, cum sa stabilesti cine joaca dublu, triplu, cvadruplu, etc.

Uite, Sabri asta zicea in 2002 ca "the deposed Iraqi leader desperately wanted a nuclear bomb". Si tu vrei sa ma faci sa cred ca tu crezi ca s-ar fi limitat numai la a o dori, bomba atomica? Ca n-ar fi incercat s-o faca, daca i s-ar fi ivit ocazia? Ca a incercat sa cumpere yellow cake din Niger este un fapt (faptul ca pina la urma tranzactia nu a avut loc nu-l absolva). Ce vrei mai mult decit atit? Ca a obstructionat cit a putut inspectiile ONU, ajungind la a-i da afara pe inspectori, iarasi este un fapt. Iar despre armele chimice, chiar si el, Sabri, spune ca ar fi fost.

Tipii astia, Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, neoconii ;-) au spus de i-a durut gura ca este vorba de un pattern de activitati care nu duc decit la o singura concluzie: ca impricinatu' daca poate, o va face, si inca la prima ocazie.

Intelege odata ca aici nu-i vorba sa ai obiectu' fizic ca sa iei o decizie! Nici la tribunal nu-i neaparat obligatoriu sa vii cu mortu' ca sa condamni pe unu'. Iar in relatiile internationale nu-i ca la tribunal. Si nici joc de-a v-ati ascunselea. Pune-te in pozitia celor care au de luat o decizie: ce faci? Astepti sa vezi ce se mai intimpla? In cazul Irakului s-a asteptat mai bine de 10 ani. Iar lucrurile, sa se imbunatateasca, ioc! Iar dupa 9/11 ar fi fost iresponsabil sa se mai astepte.

Irak a fost perceput drept o amenintare mai imediata decit Iran si Nord Korea. Uita-te acum la Iran! Tu te-ai simti bine daca ai sti ca aia din Iran au bomba? Te-ai increde in judecata rationala si responsabila a unora care pretind ca sint mesagerii lui Allah pe pamint? Ca n-au sa se "inerveze" daca vor vedea Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung cine stie ce caricatura care nu-i pe placul lor?

Somn usor, Hantzi...

Nici la tribunal nu-i neaparat obligatoriu sa vii cu mortu' ca sa condamni pe unu'.


Fraza asta m-a dat gata robinas, trebuie sa recunosc. Cum adica nu e nevoie sa aduci dovada ca cineva a fost omorit ca sa poti condamna pe cineva.? Adica dupa tine ajunge sa fie disparut, deci cadavrul lipsa si totusi banuitul sa fie condamnat pentru crima. Halal robinas. Sa nu stii tu ca, cadavrul si arma crimei sint primele lucruri pe care politia le cauta sa le puna la dosar ? Daca nu se gaseste cadavrul nici nu se pate face proces robinas ca persoana disparuta poate foarte bine sa fie in viata iar un nevinovat sa faca puscarie de pomana.

La 2006-03-21 19:19:53, Katty a scris:

> Nici la tribunal nu-i neaparat obligatoriu sa vii cu mortu' ca sa
> condamni pe unu'.
>
>
> Fraza asta m-a dat gata robinas, trebuie sa recunosc. Cum adica nu e
> nevoie sa aduci dovada ca cineva a fost omorit ca sa poti condamna pe
> cineva.? Adica dupa tine ajunge sa fie disparut, deci cadavrul lipsa
> si totusi banuitul sa fie condamnat pentru crima. Halal robinas. Sa
> nu stii tu ca, cadavrul si arma crimei sint primele lucruri pe care
> politia le cauta sa le puna la dosar ? Daca nu se gaseste cadavrul
> nici nu se pate face proces robinas ca persoana disparuta poate
> foarte bine sa fie in viata iar un nevinovat sa faca puscarie de
> pomana.
>


1) http://forum.signonsandiego.com/archive/index.php/t-34991.html
2) http://www.woodwardnews.net/features/local_story_059101624.html

3) http://www.cincypost.com/news/1997/culber071297.html

The body of the Blanchester woman hasn't been found.
But under Ohio law, a person can be tried for murder without a body.
Peelle hasn't provided details of his case, partly the result of a gag order issued by the judge.
But Peelle said Friday he will rely on a combination of circumstantial and direct evidence to prove that Doan killed Ms. Culberson.
Court documents Peelle filed provide more details.
They indicate he will have witnesses testify they saw Doan chase and then punch Ms. Culberson the night she disappeared, saw him covered in blood and later heard him talk about killing her.
The evidence he could present includes a pair of blood-stained boots, court documents note.