In the weeks since France and the Netherlands rejected the European Union's proposed Constitutional Treaty, the EU's leaders have been busy pointing fingers at each other or blaming French and Dutch citizens for misunderstanding the question they were asked. But no pan-European statesman has emerged, and no major European institution has even had the courage to provide its own analysis of the current situation, much less propose a strategic scenario for the future. To be sure, French and Dutch citizens did not respond to the question that they were supposed to answer. Their vote was a protest against globalization, a rejection of the contemporary world, with its distant and incomprehensible governing mechanisms. Like the anti-globalization movement, the new anti-Europeanism can be regarded as a demand for a different European model - an "alter-Europeanism." The issue, therefore, is not what Tony Blair, in his inaugural speech to the European Parliament, called a crisis of leadership. No statesman has emerged because the crisis runs deeper. The two world wars and the Cold War shaped European integration as a project of peace, a defense of the West's fundamental values, and common economic prosperity. This phase culminated with the collapse of communism in 1989, but the chance to overcome the Continent's historical divisions now required a redefinition of the European project. The treaties of Maastricht (1992) and Amsterdam (1997) created a new organizational structure for the EU and laid the foundations for political institutions equal to Europe's economic power. When politicians debated the EU's future, they spoke of "finality" - the end formula of European integration, as defined in a famous lecture by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer in 2000. The accompanying intellectual debate, inaugurated by the philosophers J�rgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, defined the nature of European identity, above all, against the foil of the United States, but also in terms of the challenges posed by globalization. That debate must continue, even if the French and Dutch referenda appear to have killed the Constitutional Treaty. The EU will continue to be governed under the Nice Treaty of 2000, but this leaves no room for further political integration (or enlargement), nor does it ensure the effective functioning of the Union's institutions. Drafting a new constitutional treaty would probably require even more time than was needed for the current proposal, and it is also unlikely that the necessary changes could be introduced through an intergovernmental conference. The only viable course, then, is to use today's "pause for reflection" to revive the existing Constitutional Treaty. This would require prolonging the ratification deadline until 2008. It also requires specifying a common date for ratification (through simultaneous referenda or parliamentary votes) for all countries that have not yet done so, including France and the Netherlands. In other words, the current "pause for reflection" is not the time to change the draft's text (although the intergovernmental conference could move the third part, which harmonizes the earlier treaties, to an annex). Rather, the task is to alter the political and socio-psychological context of the ratification process by addressing key questions. First, how should relations between national and common European interests be defined? At issue is not only the allocation of competencies, but also the more fundamental matter of when to rely on intergovernmental institutions and when to turn to the European people as a whole. The European Council, which represents member states in the structures of the Union, could be given a more public character. It could then be seen, in a bicameral system, as a kind of "Chamber of Nations" within the framework of what Jacques Delors called a "federation of nation states." The second question concerns the EU's scope. Europe is a peculiar combination of geography and history, but the boundaries of the EU - and thus the prospects for its further enlargement - are determined by its absorptive capacity and the adaptive abilities of candidate countries. Is enlargement the only effective policy of stabilization and peace? Or can the "neighborhood policy" become an instrument for supporting development and stabilization, much as the Marshall Plan once was for Western Europe? Third, instead of futile opposition between "liberal" and "social" models of economic development, we need a confrontation of the experiences of Great Britain and Sweden, on the one hand, and Germany and France, on the other. Are these experiences mutually exclusive, or is convergence possible? What policies reduce unemployment? Which measures can ensure the EU's global competitiveness? How can we narrow the existing differences in development and material welfare within Europe? Fourth, the EU's aspiration for a common foreign and security policy must be addressed. The threats facing the world today are supranational, so counteracting them must be supranational, too. But this is impossible without a clear European identity - and thus a common interest to be asserted and defended. In the aftermath of the French and Dutch referenda, the European Commission and the European Parliament have sketched plans for a Europe-wide debate on these issues. But such a debate also demands an organizational framework to engage European civil society, national parliaments, and pan-European mass media. Democracy carries certain costs, but they are always lower than the costs of evading popular participation. Only a new European debate that embodies the common action of European citizens and institutions can combat "alter-Europeanism" effectively. The time may not have come for a true European constitution, but confronting, rather than evading, the fundamental issues that the EU faces could create the proper context for reviving the constitutional treaty and preparing the Union for the challenges of our time. Bronislaw Geremek, a former Polish foreign minister, is a member of the European Parliament. Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2005. www.project-syndicate.org

Bronislaw GEREMEK