Some years ago the historian Fritz Stern wrote a book about Germany entitled The Politics of Cultural Despair. He used the example of three (now forgotten) bestselling authors of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to show the deep aversion of many Germans to the modern world, notably to market economics and democratic politics. For Stern, this was part of the cultural soil in which National Socialism flourished. Much has changed since the Nazi era. The murderous triumph and bloody defeat of the politics of cultural despair was followed by an economic miracle that made Germany one of the world's most prosperous countries, with nearly six decades of increasingly stable democracy. Yet there are still traces within Germany of an attitude that finds modern economics distasteful and the opening of all frontiers to a globalized world frightening. "Pure capitalism" and "globalization" evoke horrific images. Swarms of capitalist "locusts" threaten to descend on defenseless, hardworking people, to quote the unfortunate metaphor used in a recent speech by Franz M�ntefering, the chairman of the governing Social Democrats. Of course, revulsion for liberal economies and global markets is not confined to Germany. A similar sentiment formed one of the motives for the French and perhaps even the Dutch to reject the European Union's Constitutional Treaty, which some regarded as too "Anglo-Saxon" in its economic liberalism. For many, the alternative to capitalism and globalization is an idyllic image of a "European social model," which no one has yet defined. Indeed, it would be difficult to do so. Social policies in Europe - like everything else - vary widely, and popular attitudes cover a spectrum, from tired protectionism and longing for subsidies in some of "old Europe" to the free-market enthusiasm of more recent EU members in the West (Ireland and Portugal) and the East (Poland and Slovakia). In fact, Europe's much-vaunted social model is more a dream than a reality, the dream of a cozy world in which a benevolent state looks after us. This world has ceased to be viable in large part for reasons of demography, as ever more claimants for assistance make costs unaffordable. Some people - and even a few politicians - are drawing the right conclusions from this. They know that ultimately we all must rely on our own initiative and effort, and they make use of the opportunities of open markets. But others in Europe treat such attitudes like a cartoon whose caption could be in French or German: "Self-reliance is absolutely important, we depend on politics for it". Behind such differences lie deep political and cultural traditions concerning the role of the state in everyday life. This is where the United States really is different from France and Germany, while Britain has a similar tradition of distrusting the state rather than relying on it. In a different way, this is true of Italy as well. Italy has long had a large Communist Party, and the left may be in power again; but there is no gut antagonism to the freedoms that capitalism encourages. Poland is another country in which individual initiative flourishes - to the point that the apochryphal "Polish plumber" came to epitomize the threats posed by globalization in France. Needless to say, there are no such hang-ups in many of the high-growth economies of Asia. True, in India the inertia of an indigenous version of Fabian socialism had to be overcome; but this has happened. In fact, new models to square the circle of economic growth, social cohesion, and political liberty may be emerging in some of the countries that have grasped the mantle of globalization. The entrenched anti-capitalist, anti-globalization mood elsewhere is a source of concern. After all, Fritz Stern wrote his book to warn of the dangers posed by a romantic abhorrence of modernity. High, often long-term unemployment and cuts in social benefits nurture, but do not cause such attitudes; their deep-seated cultural roots matter far more. So do their consequences. A sense of frustration that results from anti-capitalist, anti-globalization sentiment leads to a lethal combination of Arcadian dreams ("France to the French") and the reality of ruthless, if seductive, leaders on the right (Jean-Marie Le Pen in France) and the left (Oskar Lafontaine and his new party in Germany). Prosperity and liberty will be the victims, unless those who grasp the opportunities of the new world prevail. Ralf Dahrendorf, author of numerous acclaimed books and a former European Commissioner from Germany, is a member of the British House of Lords, a former Rector of the London School of Economics, and a former Warden of St. Antony's College, Oxford. Copyright: Project Syndicate/Institute for Human Sciences, 2005. www.project-syndicate.org

Ralf DAHRENDORF